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Abstract 
Feminist scholars have documented with reference to multiple empirical contexts that 
feminist claims within nationalist movements are often side-lined, constructed as 
“inauthentic” and frequently discredited for imitating supposedly western notions of 
gender-based equality. Despite these problems, some feminist scholars have pointed 
to the positive aspects of nationalist movements, which frequently open up spaces for 
gender-based claims. Our research is based on the recognition that we cannot evaluate 
the fraught relationship in the abstract, but that we need to look at the specific 
historical and empirical contexts and articulations of nationalism and feminism. The 
specific case study we draw upon is the relationship between the Kurdish women’s 
movement and the wider Kurdish political movement in Turkey. We are exploring the 
ways that the Kurdish movement in Turkey has politicised Kurdish women’s rights 
activists, and examine how Kurdish women activists have reacted to patriarchal 
tendencies within the Kurdish movement.  
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Introduction  
The fraught relationship between feminism and nationalism has been subject to much 
debate in both academic and activist circles, often resulting in, what Yuval-Davis 
(2003: 27) suitably called, a ‘dialogue of the deaf’. Many feminist academics and 
activists have been categorical in judging nationalism to be antithetical to women’s 
liberation (Enloe 1989; Parker and Yaeger 1992; McClintock 1996). Western 
feminists, frequently in opposition to their own government’s national and 
international policies, tend to view nationalism as a vehicle to further patriarchy. 
Meanwhile, feminists located in the global south, particularly in contexts of 
anti-colonization and anti-occupation struggles, but also national liberation 
movements of ethnic and religious minorities, have pointed to the inextricable link 
between national and women’s liberation.  Kumari Jayawardena’s classic ​Feminism 
and Nationalism in the Third World​ (1986) provided an important intervention in this 
debate. Through various historical and empirical case studies, the edited volume 
illustrated the various ways feminists were involved in dual struggles, fighting for 
women’s rights and gender-based equality in the context of national liberation 
struggles. 
More recent scholarship has moved away from generalised assertions about 
nationalism principally being good or bad for women and gender-based struggles, 
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pointing instead to variations within nationalist movements as well as the range of 
feminist positions in any given historical and empirical context (Cockburn 2000, 
2007; Sunseri 2000; Walby 2000; Herr 2003; Yuval-Davis 2003; Al-Ali & Pratt 2011; 
O’Keefe 2013; Gull 2014). Adopting Anthony Smith’s distinction between 
“ethnocentric” and “polycentric” nationalism (1983), Ranjoo ​Seodu​ Herr, for 
example, distinguishes between justifiable and unjustifiable nationalisms. She 
contrasts the expansionist unjustifiable nationalism, built on essentialist notions of 
ethnic belonging and supremacy, with anti-essentialist pluralistic and, what she 
conceptualises as justifiable, forms of nationalism. Importantly, she stipulates that 
nationalist movements must pursue dual goals: self-determination, and the recognition 
and respect for the nation in the international arena as external goals; and internally, 
they are ‘to secure an inner environment in which the members of the nation can 
enjoy equality amongst themselves and work with one another to promote collective 
prosperity’ (Herr 2003:149). Herr stresses that these two goals are not separate, but 
intimately connected. In her view, disagreements among the co-members “are normal 
and healthy elements of national life, and sincere efforts to democratize the political 
process are indispensable prerequisites for attaining the twin goals of nationalism 
(ibid).” 
Despite this ideal(ized) intersection of external and internal goals, feminist scholars 
have argued that, in reality, feminist claims within nationalist movements are often 
side-lined, constructed as “inauthentic” and frequently discredited for imitating 
supposedly western notions of gender-based equality. Even in armed liberation 
struggles, where women play active combatant roles, women tend to experience 
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backlashes, as case studies from Eritrea (Bernal 2001; Hale 2002), Vietnam (Omar 
2004), Nicaragua (Omar 2004), Palestine (Hasso 1998), Sri Lanka (Alison 2003) and 
Algeria (Salhi 2010) illustrate. Omar, looking at the Vietnamese and Nicaraguan 
examples, argues that ‘women, once active combatants in national revolutionary 
movements, are pushed aside because their elevated status  during times of conflict 
does not conform to the traditional gender roles that consistently reemerge after 
nationalist wars’ (2004: 50). Bernal in the context of the Eritrean armed liberation 
struggle states in relation to women ex-fighters: ‘They fought side by side with men 
and killed enemy men. Their morality is suspect, their femininity is doubtful, and their 
ability to behave as obedient wives is questionable. Although national liberation has 
been achieved, the emancipation of women is at best incomplete’ (2001: 61).  
However, in the context of the Kurdish women’s movement in Iraqi-Kurdistan, we 
can see that the tensions between feminism and nationalism cannot be resolved ​per se, 
but require an intersectional and in-depth empirical approach to grasp the full 
complexity and nuances of a specific context at a particular historical moment. These 
include the configuration of social and political forces that make up nationalist 
parties, as well as women’s movements and the types of nationalism and feminism 
articulated by these different forces. The differences between women activists in Iraqi 
Kurdistan not only relate to debates over strategies to maximize women’s rights but 
also to different notions of Kurdish nationalism, ranging from patriarchal to more 
egalitarian values (Al-Ali & Pratt 2011).  
Moreover, the case of the Kurdish women’s movement in Iraqi-Kurdistan also shows 
that we need to pay attention to the way that both nationalist and feminist movements 
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are not static but might transform over time responding to changing political 
economies. The shift from national liberation movements to institutionalised 
state-building is often detrimental to women’s rights and frequently involves a shift 
towards more conservative gender norms and relations and the marginalization of 
women in the political process. Al-Ali & Pratt’s findings resonate with ​Dhruvarajan 
&Vickers (2002: 251), who make the point that women have made advances in some 
nationalist movements, particularly in their non-Western, anti-colonial form and 
typically as long as they were not modernising, state-building projects.  
In our analysis of the specific case study we are interested in, namely the Kurdish 
women’s movement in Turkey; we are also informed by Theresa O’Keefe’s (2013) 
detailed and insightful analysis of republican feminism in Northern Ireland. She 
highlights the complex nature of the relationship between feminism and nationalism, 
arguing that nationalist movements can nurture feminism, albeit sometimes in a 
reactive manner. Her research shows that feminist nationalism is partly a response to 
the patriarchal norms found within nationalist movements: ‘Feminism developed and 
gained strength precisely because of the attempts to marginalise and silence women. It 
was made meaningful, in part, because of nationalism’s patriarchal tendencies, and 
any attempts to suppress feminism actually gave it oxygen’ (2013: 186). 
Research design and methodological considerations 
In what follows, we are building on the recognition that we cannot discuss and 
evaluate the relationship between feminism and nationalism in the abstract, but that 
we need to look at the specific historical and empirical contexts and articulations of 
5 
 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in ​Nations and Nationalism​. Published 
version available from: ​http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: ​http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/  
 
nationalism and feminism. We are following feminist approaches (Al-Ali & Pratt 
2009; Mohanty 2013) that stress the significance of intersecting configurations of 
inequality and marginalization. Using intersectionality as an analytical lens allows us 
to pay attention to multiple hierarchies of power in any given empirical context. In 
relation to our specific case study, we pay particular attention to the ways that the 
marginalization of women in the context of patriarchal power relations intersects with 
the marginalization of ethnic minorities, such as Kurds within Turkey, based on 
Turkish nationalism as well as political authoritarianism.  
The specific case study we draw from is the relationship between the Kurdish 
women’s movement and the wider Kurdish political movement in Turkey, referred to 
by many of our respondents as ‘North Kurdistan’ . While we are more sceptical than 4
O’Keefe about the long-term implications for feminism in relation to nationalist 
demands, we are interested in exploring the ways that the evolving Kurdish political 
movement in Turkey has politicised Kurdish women’s rights activists, and how 
Kurdish women activists have reacted to patriarchal tendencies within the Kurdish 
political movement. We stipulate that Kurdish women activists have developed a 
gender awareness that has given rise to a strong Kurdish feminist movement, which, 
in turn, has been influencing the wider Kurdish political movement, crucially 
including a shift away from an emphasis on nationalism.  
Given the significance of the Kurdish diaspora and the transnational character of 
Kurdish political mobilization, we decided to engage in a multi-sited qualitative 
4 The Kurdish political movement, as well as many Kurds, refer to different parts of Kurdistan as ‘North 
Kurdistan’ or Bakur (South-eastern Turkey), ‘South Kurdistan’ or Bashur (Kurdish Region of Iraq), ‘West 
Kurdistan’or Rojava (northern Syria), and ‘East Kurdistan’ or Rojhelat (North-western Iran) 
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research in four different locations: Diyarbakır (Amed), Istanbul, London and Berlin. 
Between February 2015 and December 2016, we carried out in-depth, open-ended as 
well as oral history interviews with Kurdish and Turkish political activists for our 
larger project on the relationship between peace and women’s rights activism, in 
addition to engaging in five focus group discussions. Amongst our Kurdish 
respondents were MPs, co-mayors, academics, journalists, and lawyers. In total, our 
research involved 72 respondents, of whom 50 were female and 22 male. For this 
article however, we just considered material based on the interviews with 52 Kurdish 
respondents, focusing mainly on those activists who are based in South-Eastern 
Turkey, the centre for the conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish political 
movement, but also referring to some interviews carried out in the diaspora. Both 
respondents inside Turkey and in the diaspora were either former militants linked to 
the PKK, or activists and politicians linked to the legal-political branch of the Kurdish 
movement, particularly the progressive Kurdish-led People’s Democratic Party 
(HDP). 
While our discussion and analysis is grounded in the broader range of interviews, in 
this article we also  draw extensively from in-depth oral history interviews with 
Gültan Ki ​ş​anak, a long-time women’s rights activists, former MP and co-mayor of 
Diyarbakır; Ayla Akat, lawyer, former MP and veteran women’s rights activist; and 
Fɪrat Anlɪ, co-mayor of Diyarbakir. Oral history interviews allowed us an in depth 
engagement and exploration of the experiences of a number of key figures in the 
current Kurdish political movement. Oral history is often used as a qualitative 
research method in feminist research to unearth silenced, marginalised or excluded 
knowledge. During the  writing of this article Ki​ş​anak, Akat and Anlɪ, alongside 
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many other Kurdish MPs, co-mayors and women’s rights activists we interviewed, 
were detained and arrested by the Turkish government in the context of the wider 
authoritarian crack down on any form of political opposition and dissent to President 
Erdo ​ğ​an and the AKP government. While we mention the names of those respondents 
who gave us the permission to do so, we have anonymised other respondents in this 
article.  
A rapidly shifting context 
The Kurdish population, constituting the largest ethnic minority in Turkey, have 
engaged in numerous uprisings after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 
1923, all of which have been violently repressed by the Turkish state. While many 
Kurds were forced to assimilate and discard their Kurdishness, Kurdish nationalist 
sentiments endured and were strengthened by the violent repression, forced migration, 
relocation, economic and social discrimination and the lack of recognition of cultural 
rights, such as the ban on the Kurdish language and cultural activities (Updegraff 
2012; Ensaroglu 2013; Tas 2014; Aslan 2015). Mobilized and strengthened in the 
context of wider leftist politics in the 1960s and 1970s, Kurdish nationalism became 
more visible, but was fiercely fought by the Turkish generals who seized power in a 
military coup in 1980, following previous coups in 1960 and 1971. Brutal repression, 
involving the detainment and torture of thousands of Kurdish nationalists, outlawing 
the use of Kurdish in public and even in private conversations, contributed to the rise 
of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, ​Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan​), the militant 
Kurdish political group founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 (Knapp et al. 2016). 
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The PKK initially started as a militia and Marxist-Leninist organisation that engaged 
in armed resistance, combining revolutionary socialism with Kurdish nationalism, 
aiming to create an independent Kurdish state. While the PKK continues to function 
as an armed guerrilla organisation despite several declarations of cease-fire, the wider 
Kurdish political movement has employed non-violent forms of resistance and has 
been active in the political and legal sphere. A number of Kurdish political parties 
have emerged in recent years. The parties have been ideologically linked to the PKK 
yet have developed their own political elite and non-violent practices. The most recent 
example of the Kurdish-led yet broader progressive coalition of the People’s 
Democratic Party (HDP), has constituted a significant shift in Kurdish politics.  
In more recent years, the PKK as well as the wider legal and political Kurdish 
movement in Turkey has shifted from an emphasis on Kurdish nationalism and 
independence to the idea of democratic confederalism, or radical democracy within 
existing state boundaries ​(Akkaya & Jongerden 2012)​. According to leading Kurdish 
political figures we have interviewed inside Turkey and in the diaspora, ​democratic 
confederalism promotes the idea of radical participatory democracy with principles 
based on multi-culturalism, anti-statism, social ecology and feminism. ​Several 
commentators have noted the ​influence of the communalist ideas of US 
social-ecologist Murray Bookchin, and that of other revolutionary anarchist thinkers, 
such as Emma Goldman, in addition to the influence of revolutionary movements 
such as the Zapatistas, on Öcalan’s recent writings. After his arrest in 1999, Öcalan 
began to criticise the concept of the nation-state and the PKK’s stated goal changed 
from the establishment of an independent Kurdistan to the notion of democratic 
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confederalism (Akkaya & Jongerden 2012; Anderson & Egret 2016; ​Knapp et al. 
2016)​. Much emphasis has been put on the significance of external influences and 
philosophies on Öcalan’s prison writings produced in solitary confinement on Imrali 
Island, and the impact of his writings on the Kurdish political movement, including 
the women’s movement. However, in this article, we will try to show that the 
experiences and struggles of Kurdish women’s rights activists have themselves 
contributed to a shift in the ideology and political practise of the wider Kurdish 
political movement. 
The empirical context for our specific case study has been rapidly and radically 
shifting since we conceived of our project in the beginning of 2015. At the time, a 
peace process between the Turkish government and the Kurdish political movement 
was on its way following peace negotiations (Tas 2016a, 2016b). As we have shown 
elsewhere, these negotiations were problematic and unsuccessful for various complex 
reasons (insert reference).  Following the elections of June 2015, when the HDP 
managed to gain 13 percent of the vote, thereby stopping the governing Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) from gaining an absolute majority, a brutal crackdown on 
Kurdish villages and towns in south-eastern Turkey brought the peace process to an 
abrupt halt. President Erdoğan’s heavy-handed election tactics in the run-up to the 
repeat elections in November 2015 allowed the AKP to regain its single-party 
majority. 
The intensified persecution of the Kurdish political movement since June 2015 has 
been accompanied by an increase in authoritarianism, Turkish nationalism and a 
repression of dissent and political opposition, most notably of academics and 
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journalists. However, since the failed military coup in July 2016, the Turkish 
government’s targeting of Kurdish politicians, human rights defenders and Kurdish 
co-mayors and women’s rights activists, as part of its wider onslaught against 
democratic forces and voices, has taken a sharp turn for the worst (Yeginsu & Timur 
2016). The contested referendum results of 16 April 2017 have provided President 
Erdoğan with more power and means to pursue his authoritarian politics. 
Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict and worsening situation in Syria is playing a crucial 
role in shaping the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. The success of the sister party to the 
PKK in Syria, namely the Democratic Union Party (PYD, ​Partiya Yekîtiya 
Demokrat ​), the most significant and successful opposition to ISIS in neighbouring 
northern Syria (Rojava) and its attempt at building an alternative egalitarian society 
based on principles of democratic confederalism, have contributed to the Turkish 
government’s initial support for ISIS​ ​and its ongoing attacks on Kurdish troops and 
fighters in northern Syria. Developments in Iraq, especially in terms of the effort to 
contain and defeat ISIS, are also crucial in understanding and contextualising 
Turkish-Kurdish dynamics within Turkey and more broadly in the region. As we will 
illustrate in the below, the shifting context has had an impact on the relationship and 
development of Kurdish nationalism and feminism in Turkey.  
Kurdish women’s double struggle 
Kurdish feminist organizations emerged partly as a reaction to both the oppression by 
the Turkish state as well as the nationalist and often patronizing attitude of the 
Turkish feminist movement. Despite the critique of Kemalism as patriarchal and 
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authoritarian by the more radical and autonomous Turkish feminist organizations that 
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, our Kurdish respondents all stressed that the specific 
plights of and challenges for Kurdish women’s rights activists were largely ignored or 
dismissed by third wave Turkish feminists (Yuksel 2006; Diner & Toktas 2010; Çaha 
2011). According to Arat (2008), Kurdish feminists collaborated with Turkish 
feminists on certain major issues, such as violence against women. However, while 
the limitations of the Turkish feminist movement became the subject of Islamic 
feminists’ critique of its authoritarian secular character, it was Kurdish feminists who 
pointed to its ethnocentric ‘Turkishness’ (Diner & Toktas 2010). 
Marginalised and estranged by the Kemalist modernization project in Turkey (Yuksel 
2006), Kurdish women became initially politicised in leftist movements during the 
1960s and 1970s, followed by larger scale mobilization through the PKK in the 
second half of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s. The PKK’s strategy of a long term 
‘people’s war’ required the mobilization and active participation of women (Çağlayan 
2007, 2012; Şahin-Mencutek 2016). Within the first decade of the establishment of 
the PKK, women’s participation in armed struggle increased rapidly from one percent 
in 1987 to 15-20 percent in 1993, which translated into about 2000 women fighters 
(Kutschera 1993). A few years after the establishment of the PKK, a group of women 
in the PKK created the Kurdistan Union of Patriotic Women (​Yekitiya Jinen 
Welatparezen Kurdistan​, YJWK) and, later, the Kurdish Women’s Liberation 
Movement, which was dissolved by the PKK in 2000. By 1995, the Free Women of 
Kurdistan Troops (​Yekitiya Jinen Azad a Kurdistan ​, YJAK), a military branch 
composed exclusively of female combatants, was founded. Women fighters were no 
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longer under the direct command of male guerrillas and were able to make their own 
decisions. This development gave women significant self-confidence and led to 
significant ideological, political, and social transformations (Çağlayan 2007, 2012). 
Several of our respondents pointed out that one of the co-founders of the PKK, Sakine 
Cansız, was a woman who was concerned with the specific struggles and inequalities 
facing Kurdish women from the beginning of her involvement. Ayla Akat, lawyer, 
former MP and long –time women’s rights activist told us: ‘Sakine Cansız was one of 
the people directly involved in the creation of different women’s branches. Her 
personal experience of torture in a Turkish prison in the 1980s, and then of the 
Kurdish guerrilla movement, played an important role in her work for women’s 
rights’ (Tas 2016b). However, women’s involvement as ‘sexless militants’ (Çaha 
2011: 438) and asexual political activists for the Kurdish nationalist cause, initially 
translated into a side-lining of gender-based forms of inequalities and discriminations. 
As one of our respondents, a former PKK militant and now activist in Berlin, stated in 
July 2015, the PKK forbade any sexual contact among fighters who were to respect 
strict equality, but also ignored gender-specific concerns and needs. 
The emergence of critical women’s voices within the Kurdish political movement and 
the emergence of independent women’s organizations was clearly also a consequence 
of patriarchal structures within Kurdish society and Kurdish political organizations 
(Çaha 2011; Diner & Toktas 2010). Veteran political and feminist activist Gültan 
Ki​ş​anak became an MP for the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in 2007 
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and was elected as the first female co-mayor of Diyarbak​ı​r in 2014. She remembers 
the early phases of Kurdish political mobilization in Turkey: 
Since the beginning of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey, women have taken active 
and important roles. However, we should accept that in the 1970s and 1980s women’s rights 
were sacrificed for the sake of general political and national aims. The slogan was to first have 
a revolution and then make some improvements in women’s rights and gender equality. […} 
Key roles for women were not taken by women themselves, but ‘given’ by a male-dominated 
political leadership. After any success or political achievement, women were easily forgotten 
and forced back into the home to continue in their ‘traditional’ roles (Ki​ş​anak et al. 2016).  
The side-lining of women’s issues within wider revolutionary and nationalist 
movements has been documented widely in many different empirical contexts, as we 
mentioned above. Most of our respondents who had been involved in the movement 
for several decades concurred with Ki​ş ​anak’s assessment that the Kurdish political 
movement was initially replicating a global revolutionary tradition that viewed 
women and gender-related equality as secondary to its wider aims. This notion also 
resonates in Çaha’s (2011) analysis of the first three Kurdish women’s magazines that 
emerged in the late 1990s, ​Roza, Jujin, and Jin uˆ Jiyan​. Çaha illustrates that all three 
magazines criticize not only traditional feudal values in Kurdish society, but also 
revolutionary progressive Kurdish men. Based on the views expressed in the various 
articles published in the magazines, Çaha (2011:446) argues that women’s individual 
and gender-based interests were perceived to go hand in hand with their national 
interests. 
What becomes apparent is that the earlier criticisms of Kurdish women’s rights 
activists towards the patriarchal nature of the movement was articulated within the 
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broader framework of a national liberation struggle. Initially, women did not 
challenge the main ideological underpinnings of the movement, particularly in terms 
of its national liberation and independence aims.  
Our respondents differed in terms of their level of criticism towards the historically 
male political leadership and patriarchal culture within the movement. While many of 
our respondents expressed their frustration with Kurdish men in the movement, all 
Kurdish women’s activist and politician we talked to stressed the continuous support 
of Abdullah Öcalan. Everyone we talked to acknowledged the impact of Öcalan’s 
ideas especially in relation to his more recent prison writings, which emphasise the 
centrality of gender-based equality. Öcalan crucially states:  
The extent to which society can be thoroughly transformed is determined by the extent of the 
transformation attained by women. Similarly, the level of woman’s freedom and equality 
determines the freedom and equality of all sections of society […].  For a democratic nation, 
woman’s freedom is of great importance too, as liberated woman constitutes liberated society. 
Liberated society in turn constitutes a democratic nation. Moreover, the need to reverse the 
role of man is of revolutionary importance (Öcalan 2013: 57). 
By the time of his arrest in 1999, Abdullah Öcalan would have witnessed the 
important contribution of Kurdish women to the Kurdish struggle but also their 
internal struggles within the movement. Since his period in solitary confinement on 
Imrali Island, Öcalan has published several writings in which he has engaged with the 
critique of patriarchy developed by the Kurdish women’s movement (Öcalan 2011, 
2013, 2015). In his writings, he conceptualises the nation state not only as a “colony 
of capital” but also an extension of patriarchy. His model of democratic autonomy 
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without a state, which promotes the idea of decentralised self-government by councils 
and cooperatives, as well as confederalist models of co-existence and cooperation, 
puts gender equality at its centre (Öcalan 2011). Yet several of the other women we 
talked to emphasises that the achievements of the women’s movement were not 
merely handed down through a shift in ideology by the male political leadership, 
however supportive, but had to be fought for over many years of hard struggles.  
The 1990s, for example, were extremely tense and violent in terms of the conflict 
between the Turkish state and the Kurdish political movement, including the forcible 
evacuation of 3000 Kurdish villages and the displacement of anything between 1-4 
million Kurds depending on the sources (Kurban 2012:7). Not just Kurdish guerrillas, 
but thousands innocent male and female civilians were killed by government forces 
(Belge 2016). Our respondents’ recollections about this period are in line with Dryaz’ 
assessment that women’s involvement was encouraged by the Kurdish movement as a 
symbol of liberation and revolution but also as a symbol of Kurdish culture: “In 
parades and demonstrations they occupied the first rows by dressing up in the red, 
green and yellow colours which constitute a recognizable Kurdish symbol” (Dryaz 
2011). 
Ki​ş​anak and others remember the 1990s as a time when women organized and led 
numerous demonstrations; they were arrested in large numbers, tortured and even 
killed. It is during the 1990s that women become politicized on a large scale and 
learnt about their legal rights. Women’s increased participation, both in armed 
struggle but also protests and demonstrations, in which they developed creative and 
innovative slogans, challenged not only the Turkish state, but also previously 
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accepted gender norms and roles within Kurdish society (Çağlayan 2007, 2012). 
Several women we talked to stressed that women’s political participation in the 
1990s, despite or possibly because of brutal state repression at the time, gave women 
more confidence in their political roles. However, some respondents also mentioned 
that they became more aware and conscious of the sexism and misogyny existent 
amongst Kurdish male political activists and politicians. 
As mentioned earlier, the radical ideological shift from above, which, in our view, 
was as much inspired by the actual experiences and struggles of Kurdish women’s 
rights activists as by outside political philosophers and revolutionaries, did not 
automatically translate into gender-based equality. Kurdish women continued to 
struggle within the wider political movement to gain recognition. Ki​ş​anak recalls the 
difficulties faced by women’s rights activists within the movement: 
It might be difficult to believe but when I look back at my own experience and story, the 
hardest time for me as a woman was not in prison. It was not my time at university or when I 
was working as a journalist. But it was the struggle we had to fight for in order to get a 
women’s quota for MPs. During the time before the 2007 general election when we made our 
first important moves towards a quota, our male friends were happy about our hard work. We 
were organizing meetings and demonstrations, and were facing the police on a daily basis as 
we worked hard in our political and gender struggles. In the 2007 general election…, [w]e 
wanted an equal number of male and female MPs. The 40 per cent quota for women had been 
one of our party policies since 2002, but its implementation had been postponed to the next 
election. We did not want any further postponement. We wanted the policy to be put into 
practice. Our attempts created a big discussion within the Kurdish political movement. 
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Ki​ş​anak’s recollection challenges the widespread notion that radical changes in the 
political leadership and wider struggle of the Kurdish movement are directly linked to 
the writings of Öcalan. Clearly, as Çağlayan (2007, 2012) and others have shown, 
Öcalan’s  focus on the centrality of gender-based equality for the wider project of 
democracy and liberation greatly helped Kurdish women’s rights activists to make 
their case and persuade the men in the movement. But our research suggests that it 
took more than his writings for the men in the movement to slowly accept women not 
only symbolically or in token positions, but as proper counterparts and political actors 
and leaders. In 1999, three Kurdish women were elected as local mayors for the first 
time. This number increased significantly in 2004 when there were 14 women 
mayors. In 2004, the system of co-chairing started, even though it was not legal yet 
and not widely accepted.  
Several of our respondents stressed that the 2007 elections were revolutionary. 
Women became more confident as co-chairs and men started to accept them as equals. 
Zeynep Şahin-Mentucek (2016) has argued that the mobilisation strategies of the 
wider Kurdish political movement provided the conditions for Kurdish women to 
become more involved in formal party politics and to insist on the implementation of 
a gender quota. While we broadly agree with her analyses, we would like to add that 
Kurdish women’s active struggle within the wider Kurdish political movement and 
the emergence of a powerful Kurdish women’s movement also contributed to the 
success in their involvement in party politics. Moreover, our respondents emphasized 
that it was not simply a matter of a quota and co-chairing, but that the actual style and 
work of parliament changed. Women, for example, did not ask for permission 
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anymore to speak on important subjects such as the defence budget. Even after 
successful elections in 2007, Kurdish women activists had to struggle against ideas of 
tokenism and using women for symbolic effect. 
Again, according to our respondents, the writings of Öcalan helped women to justify 
their demands for more equal representation and proper political participation. But the 
writings alone did not lead to these goals automatically but had to be fought for step 
by step by Kurdish women’s rights activists. The male co-mayor of Diyarbakır, Firat 
Anli, told us in September 2015: 
The main victory of Kurdish women was not just against the state stopping Kurds to be 
assimilated; it was against patriarchal men and society. Patriarchy and autocratic nation states 
have similar mind-sets, similar souls and similar aims. Both are based on inequality and the 
imposition of hegemony and one single identity. Both approaches are very selfish and do not 
want to share power and positions equally. The Kurdish women’s movement has managed to 
transform Kurdish patriarchal men as well as the patriarchal mind set of the Turkish state. 
The experiences of Ki ​ş​anak, and others we talked to who have been active in the 
Kurdish political movement for many years, reveals that from the outset there were 
tensions within the Kurdish liberation movement linked to differing views about 
strategies and tactics but also different gendered positionalities, needs and 
experiences. It is also apparent that the nationalist Kurdish political movement gave 
rise to a growing and increasingly influential women’s movement, which, in turn has 
transformed and shaped the wider political movement in parallel with the ideological 
shifts developed by Öcalan. 
Beyond nationalism? 
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While all activists we talked to agreed on the need for independent women’s 
organizations and institutions, we noticed a range of positions and a continuum of 
views regarding the importance of an independent nation for Kurds. On one side of 
the continuum, many activists would emphasize that nationalism was bad for women, 
whether Turkish or Kurdish nationalism, and that a pursuit of radical democracy, 
justice and egalitarianism was a priority in their struggle for women’s rights. 
According to official PKK ideology, capitalism and the nation-state represent the 
dominant and exploitative male in its most institutionalized form. The Kurdish 
academic and activist Dilar Dirik puts it the following way (Maur et al. 2015: 27-8): 
Many people think that a national cause — a national liberation movement or nationalism — 
is incompatible with women’s liberation. I agree, because nationalism has many patriarchal, 
feudal, primitive premises that in one way or another boil down to passing on the genes of the 
male bloodline and reproducing domination, to pass on from one generation to another what is 
perceived as a “nation.” Add to that the extremely gendered assumptions that accompany 
nationalism, which affect family life, labor relations, the economy, knowledge, culture, and 
education, and it becomes evident that it is a very masculinized concept.  
However, some of the Kurdish women activists whom we had conversations with 
were more ambiguous in their views and seem to hold on to the close relationship 
between national liberation and women’s liberation. For example, this middle-aged 
veteran activist and former PKK militant, now based in Diyarbakır, told us in 
September 2015: 
We are part of a nation whose identity has not been recognised for almost a century. The 
women of the Kurdish nation have also not existed, according to the dominant state structure. 
Without the recognition of a national identity, it is not possible to focus on issues for Kurdish 
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women. For that reason, when Kurdish women started our movement in the 1990s, the 
national cause was the first aim. The national cause came above everything. But after some 
time, we recognised that even our Kurdish male comrades, who were taking part in 
demonstrations with us, were also acting as representatives of authority. Small branches of the 
hegemonic state were actively oppressing women in every household, community and 
workplace. Then we decided that we needed to fight against two authorities: the state and 
masculine authority at the same time.  
The co-mayor of Diyarbakır, Firat Anli also recognized that many Kurdish people 
want to put the aims and needs of Kurdish nationalism before gender-based equality 
and rights of minorities. He explained to us: 
[S]ome of our members have been questioning whether it is our business to support modernist, 
leftist, or socialist ideology and the rights and needs of women and poor people. They want us 
to focus first on the national identity of Kurdistan. For them nationalist needs are the most 
important and should come before everything else. They believe this approach would help 
produce a Kurdish independent state. Then, after that, they suggest we could focus on other 
things, including gender equality. This strong nationalist ideology exists among many Kurds 
and the continuation of state violence helps this approach to gain power. 
We found that within the diaspora there seemed to be more emphasis played on the 
importance of creating an independent state for Kurds as a pre-condition to achieve 
not only freedom from oppression but also gender-based equality. A Kurdish female 
activist and lawyer who used to be a former PKK militant, and is now based in Berlin 
stated in July 2015: 
It is not time for Kurds to have multiple political ideas and opposition; it is time to create a 
Kurdish state under one umbrella of Kurdishness. Without creating a safe place for Kurds, 
multiple voices and division can only help our enemies and not the Kurds. All rights, 
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including gender equality, democracy and rule of law can be discussed after our national 
liberation. 
In a similar vain, a male Kurdish activist from London, who has been critical of the 
Kurdish political movement, particularly the PKK’s recent policies, argued: 
Nothing is more important than to have our own state. The PKK and the Kurdish movement 
are so obsessed with their old-fashioned Leninist ideology, and communal life. They claim 
that men and women are ​heval​ [friend] but cannot be lovers. This is against our natural life of 
human being. They have claimed that they have created gender equality. But this is not true 
either. The Kurdish population is declining because of their anti-sex policies. They have given 
up creating an independent Kurdish state. These actions are not for the benefit of Kurds.  
Diasporas are often more fiercely nationalist than people who remain, given their 
forced migration trajectories and their ability to take more antagonistic political 
positions in situations of relative safety. However, even amongst some of those we 
talked to inside Turkey, the brutal crackdown on Kurdish towns in South-Eastern 
Turkey and the Kurdish political leadership, including MPs of the Kurdish-led 
progressive People’s Democratic Party (HDP) and co-mayors of Kurdish towns, 
increased the view amongst many that peace and democracy are impossible within the 
context of the Turkish nation state.  
At the same time that nationalism is still a strong mobilising force amongst Kurds, the 
ideas and practices put forward in the prison writing of Abdullah Öcalan, developed 
and initially put into practise by Kurdish women’s rights activists in the context of 
their struggle with the Turkish nation state and the male Kurdish political movement, 
have influenced Kurdish women activists and wider Kurdish politics beyond Turkey. 
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Most prominently, the ideas of the centrality of gender-based equality for radical 
democracy and the rejection of the nation state as an extension of both capitalism and 
patriarchy has been central to the vision and practices used within the Movement for a 
Democratic Society (TEV-DEM) in northern Syria (Rojava). The establishment of 
women’s councils, academies and cooperatives and the sharing of all leadership 
positions between men and women are integral to the attempt to build a radically 
democratic, multi-cultural and egalitarian society in northern Syria (Maur et al. 2015; 
Knapp et al. 2016). While it is beyond the scope of this article to focus on the way 
that these ideas are articulated in the political and social organization of the cantons 
of ​Jazira​, ​Kobanî​, and Afrin, as well as the ​Shahba region​ in northern Syria, it is 
important to recognise that the so-called Rojava revolution and women’s prominent 
role within it, is inspired and informed by the dynamic between Kurdish women’s 
rights activists and the wider movement linked to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and 
struggle. Beyond South-Eastern Turkey and northern Syria, these ideas and practises 
are also known and discussed amongst Kurdish women’s rights activists in northern 
Iraq (‘South Kurdistan’) and North-western Iran (‘East Kurdistan’). Within the 
Kurdish diaspora, especially in places like the UK and Germany with large numbers 
of political opposition activists, Kurdish women’s rights organizations flourish and 
attempt to develop independently while also influencing the larger Kurdish diaspora 
organizations. 
Recognizing the transnational reach and scope of Kurdish women’s rights activism, 
the movement has attempted to create umbrella institutions to reflect the scale of 
Kurdish women’s mobilization and need for independent spaces. Shortly before 
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embarking on our research, the Free Women Congress (KJA – ​Kongreya Jinen Azad​) 
was established as an umbrella organization and attempt to provide a more 
institutionalised framework for the Kurdish women’s movement. The former MP, 
lawyer and prominent women’s rights activist Ayla Akat explained to us in September 
2015: 
It was not enough for us anymore to just come together during International Women’s Day, or 
on one or two other occasions during the year. It was, and is, necessary to have a strong 
committee, with institutions dealing with women’s issue on a daily basis. It’s not just about 
focusing on specific problems and having demonstrations. It is about the creation of a new sort 
of politics, a new kind of education, new spaces for skill development, and equality in every 
part of life for women... It is not enough to just have a few positions as a lip-service… These 
very bad political and social structures have to change... We need to destroy the politics, 
which justifies this violence and exclusion. 
In recent years, the Kurdish women’s movement promotes the idea of ​Jineolojî 
women’s science, often described as “the creation of a women’s paradigm” which 
was first introduced by Öcalan in ‘The Sociology of Freedom’ (2009). Attempting to 
develop the epistemological and theoretical underpinnings of the transformative 
practises and politics developed by Kurdish women activists, the women cadres and 
wider Kurdish political movement adapted and developed the term ​Jineoloj. ​The 
concept is​ ​built on the principle that without the freedom of women within society and 
without a real consciousness surrounding women no society can call itself free’ 
(Nurhak 2014). According to three members of the Women’s Academy  we 5
5 The Women’s Academy was founded by Kurdish women’s rights activists in the district of Sur in Diyarbakır 
 (Amed) in June 2010. It has been a centre of research and education, and as a vehicle to support activism against 
gender-based violence and to further gender-based equality and justice. There are now many Kurdish women’s 
academies established. 
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interviewed in Diyarbakır in September 2015, women’s academies have been 
established in many places in South-Eastern Turkey and northern Syria to develop the 
concept of ​Jineolojî ​ and to discuss a range of relevant topics, such as women and 
history, women and politics, women and science etc. In 2016, the Women’s Academy 
in Diyarbakır established the journal ​Jineolojî, ​soliciting contributions from Middle 
Eastern and western-based feminists in addition to writings by Kurdish women 
activists. Aside from the more internationally- oriented intellectual endeavour, the 
concept is also employed in the education programmes of male and female cadres 
involved in the armed wing of the movement as a tool to stress the significance of 
gender-based equality being central to freedom and democracy. Öcalan’s vision of 
Jineolojî ​hinges on a critique of the methods used in “traditional social sciences” and 
imitations of feminism. 
It is questionable  how far Abdullah Öcalan has familiarised himself with the 
epistemological shifts in the social sciences and humanities over the past decades as 
well as the various strands in global feminist thought and activism. Long before 
Öcalan’s call to challenge scientific knowledge production,  postmodern, 
post-structural, Marxist, postcolonial and transnational feminist epistemologies and 
politics had already unsettled positivist notions of objectivity.  Moreover, many 
feminist theorists and activists across the globe have criticised and challenged 
premises of liberal and imperialist feminisms. Yet, the notion of ​Jineolojî​ ​ does not 
seem to build on these various critical stands of thoughts but appears to presume a 
Kurdish exceptionalism and the attempt to ethnicise the political experiences and 
struggles of Kurdish women. Kurdish women’s rights activists might or might not be 
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aware of the short-comings of the writings but it is practically impossible to find 
anyone openly criticizing Öcalan’s writings. We speculate that Öcalan’s special 
position in the Kurdish imagination and struggle is closely linked to his long-term 
political exile and imprisonment, but also his revolutionary ideas that have provided 
the Kurdish women’s movement with invaluable ideological and political tools and 
support. 
Another Kurdish activist and journalist, Ayse Gӧkhan, pointed to the historical 
isolation of Kurds, which contributed to the intellectual and political separation from 
wider global feminist thought and activism: 
Of course Kurds have been a closed community and Kurdistan has been a closed area for a 
long time. When some people started calling us ‘feminist’ we did not know what the word 
meant. We did not even know if this was a compliment or an insult. Later we recognised that 
the work we do and the ideas we have were part of feminism. We were feminist without even 
knowing about the word. It is not words, which make you feminist. Only your actions only 
can show if you are a real feminist or not (Diyarbarkır, September 2015).  
Akat and Ki ​ş​anak, as well as some other women’s activists of different generations, 
had the chance to travel abroad and meet with women’s rights activists in regional and 
global ​fora,​ thereby recognizing the long trajectories of feminist struggles in many 
different parts of the world as well as the range of different feminisms. Yet, it became 
apparent that many of our respondents equate feminism with white western liberal 
feminism, as opposed to its Marxist, postcolonial or transnational feminist strands.  
Although we are sceptical about the epistemological foundations and theoretical 
contributions of ​Jineolojî -  ​based on our respondents’ assertions about the centrality 
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of the project - we would argue that it plays an important role. It provides an 
ideological basis for Kurdish women’s rights activists to develop their struggle and 
find the necessary support amongst the male political leadership as well as the 
Kurdish population more broadly. However, we also recognize that despite these 
discursive, ideological and experiential foundations for a politics that centres 
gender-based equality and justice, their translation and implementation into everyday 
lives within the political movement, but even more into  society more broadly, proves 
extremely challenging. A Kurdish female activist closely linked to the HDP, stated in 
Diyarbakır: 
There are many difficulties of implementing changes. Women don’t only suffer at the hand of 
the state and its policies. Violence and oppression continue in every part of society, from 
different institutions and men, who are also representatives of the state. Violence from the 
state, state policies and institutions, patriarchal society and finally men are the main reasons 
for the establishment of the Democratic Free Women’s Movement. 
Here, we would add that in terms of political practice, the Kurdish women’s 
movement is translating the concept of intersectionality into concrete every day 
strategies and struggles. Kurdish women’s rights activists not only recognize that 
patriarchy, nationalism, authoritarianism and capitalism represent intersecting systems 
of inequality but their campaigns, organizations and tactics all reflect intersectional 
politics. For example, we observed feminist consciousness-raising sessions being 
combined with education about the history of Kurds, while also planning income 
generation and welfare provisions as part of the programmes and activities of 
women’s organisations. While the intersections of gender (women) and ethnicity 
(Kurdish) are clearly the two privileged categories our respondents referred to, class is 
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also perceived as an important marker of difference and inequality. However, as 
became evident in some of our interviews, class and gender seem to be conflated at 
times, with women designated as a class in and of itself. Consequently, the struggle 
for gender equality is also perceived to be struggle against class inequalities.  
Yet, unlike the republican feminism that grew out of the Irish republican movement as 
O’Keefe (2013) discusses in her work, the Kurdish feminist movement has not 
tackled issues linked to reproductive rights and sexuality. Given that women’s roles as 
biological and symbolic reproducers of nation states and ethnic communities 
(Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1987) is key to nationalism in its various articulations, we 
speculate that Kurdish women’s rights activists will not be able to radically transform 
Kurdish society outside, either the armed wing or the political cadres, unless they start 
to address issues linked to sexuality and morality. According to our respondents 
inside Turkey and in the diaspora, both Kurdish male and female fighters are tasked to 
be celibate during their struggle, and have to become sexless beings in order to live 
egalitarian lives. Meanwhile, reproduction and broader sexual relations within wider 
Kurdish society have not been challenged systematically.  
Clearly, the bracketing of sexuality and reproductive rights out of the Kurdish 
women’s rights struggle, and that of the wider political movement is a bargaining with 
conservative patriarchal gender norms and an attempt to not alienate prevailing 
notions of morality, honour and propriety. As Çağlayan (2012) demonstrates in her 
work, Öcalan’s writings in the 1990s engages in a critique of “the traditional family”, 
particularly in relation to women’s honour (​namus ​). By shifting away the focus from 
sexuality and romantic love to the protection and defence of the homeland, Öcalan not 
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only encouraged men to privilege the revolutionary liberation struggle over the 
control of women’s bodies, he also removed the barriers for women to participate in 
the struggle (Çağlayan 2012:12). However, this reconceptualization of ​namus​ was not 
only based on the idea that love and sexuality are dangerous distractions from the 
national struggle, it also led to new forms of control over both women’s and men’s 
bodies. While militant Kurdish women who died in combat or during suicide attacks 
became the new national heroines and symbols of the Kurdish nation, women who 
remained in villages and towns continued to be circumscribed by conservative norms 
and attitudes towards gender relations and sexuality, even if women’s status and 
political participation increased. Kurdish women activists are also challenged to 
desexualise themselves (Şahin-Mencutek 2016: 480-1). The issue of sexuality largely 
remained a taboo subject amongst the women and men we interviewed, although 
some are more open to discuss issues linked to LGBTQ rights.  
Conclusions: From feminist nationalism to feminist transnationalism? 
Rather than conceptualizing nationalism and feminism as two separate, often 
competing or contradictory political movements, our analysis points to the dialectic 
relationship between the two. A Kurdish feminist consciousness and movement 
emerged in the context of several intersecting dynamics: the oppression and specific 
gender regime linked to the Turkish state, the Kemalist and Turkish nationalist 
character of the Turkish feminist movement, gendered forms of oppression and 
inequalities within Kurdish communities as well as the patriarchal tendencies of and 
unequal relations with men in the Kurdish political movement. At the same time that 
Kurdish women activists started to set up their own journals, branches and 
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organizations, they also influenced and changed the wider Kurdish political 
movement. Despite their commitment to the Kurdish nationalist cause, Kurdish 
women developed a sophisticated and nuanced critique of the patriarchal nature of the 
nationalist movement as well as the nationalist character of the Turkish feminist 
movement. While the Kurdish women’s movement in South-eastern Turkey has 
played a pivotal role in challenging and transforming the wider political movement, 
Abdullah Öcalan and women’s rights activists themselves have been involved in the 
attempt to ethnicise the Kurdish women’s rights struggle by developing the notion of 
Jineolojî. ​These developments require us to rethink simplistic and homogenizing 
depictions of the relationship between nationalism and feminism.  
While our analysis is informed by Handan Çağlayan’s work (2007, 2012) about the 
shift in gender ideology in the Kurdish political movement from the 1980s to the 
1990s, our research shifts the focus from Öcalan’s writings to the experiences and 
contributions of Kurdish women activists. Our research illustrates that Kurdish 
nationalism developed and transformed over the past decades in a dialectical 
relationship with the emergence and development of the Kurdish feminist movement. 
The relationship is complicated by the fact that the Kurdish political movement is far 
more heterogeneous than often portrayed with a range of different positions and 
relationships to the PKK. For example, we found that the Kurdish women’s rights 
activists we talked to had differing experiences of armed struggle. While some got 
politicized in the context of becoming female militants within the PKK, others 
become involved within the broader Kurdish legal and political movement, which, at 
the time of our research, was much less militarized and invested very differently in 
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finding a political solution to the conflict with the Turkish state. We also found that 
our respondents had very different relationships to the recent ideological shift 
developed in Öcalan’s prison writings ​. ​While some women seemed to refer to the 
writings as a form of dogma, others appeared to use it to back their own positions, 
which had clearly developed as a result of long- term political struggle and 
experiences. This point is often overlooked in analysis, as the reference to Öcalan’s 
writings is frequently mistaken as a straightforward dogmatic adherence, while our 
analysis points to a much more complex and diverse picture.  
The specific case study of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey also provides 
further evidence that the relationship between feminism and nationalism cannot be 
assessed abstractly nor categorically, but needs to be looked at historically and in a 
specific empirical context. The broader context in Turkey and the region have 
significantly impacted on this complex and entangled relationship that has evolved 
over time. We could detect significant shifts in attitudes even during our 2 years 
period of fieldwork. At moments of lower scale conflict, spaces are clearly opening 
up for feminist demands and initiatives to promote gender-based justice and equality. 
However, more acute and heightened violence and conflict, as it unfolded in Turkey 
after the elections of June 2015 and the failed coup of July 2016, provide more 
incentives for nationalist sentiments and activism, and often lead to the 
marginalization of gender-based claims. 
Furthermore, an empirically-grounded analysis helps us to understand not only 
heterogeneous positions, but also internal contradictions and frequent gaps between 
official rhetoric and more private and individual views and opinions. The Kurdish 
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movement loosely linked to or inspired by the PKK has officially not only abandoned 
violent struggle but also its commitment to an independent nation state called 
Kurdistan and is favouring a non-ethnically based radical democracy and a confederal 
system within the borders of existing nation states (Maur et al. 2015; Knapp et al. 
2016). However, in reality, nationalist sentiments are still strong and existent in a 
context where the Turkish government has engaged in the most brutal and ferocious 
crack down on the political and legal branch of the Kurdish political movement. 
Given the extreme challenges posed by the Turkish state, much of the activism, 
campaigns and initiatives by Kurdish women’s rights activists based in Turkey are 
directed towards the Turkish state despite their commitment to a transnational 
struggle for radical democracy and gender equality. 
Regionally, Kurdish nationalism has been strengthened by the fact that Kurds, who 
are engaged in armed resistance against ISIS in northern Syria and Iraqi-Kurdistan, 
have also been under attack by the Turkish army. It is apparent that there exist 
contesting views about the idea of a Kurdish independent state, and these views are 
often only expressed in private as they differ from the official script. 
We agree with O’Keefe (2013) that much of the literature that explores the 
relationship between nationalism and feminism focuses on the negative impact of 
nationalism on women, and fails to analyse carefully women’s agency. Our article 
reveals the transformative processes within the Kurdish nationalist movement, which 
have led to the politicisation of women and the emergence of a feminist identity and a 
collectivity engaged in feminist action. Kurdish feminist nationalism in turn 
developed a critique of nationalism while the political leadership also distanced itself 
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from the nationalist trope. In that process, Kurdish feminist nationalism transformed 
into what one might coin a Kurdish transnational feminism. As we pointed out, this 
transformation has not been without tensions and contradictions. Notwithstanding the 
internal contradictions and the limitations we have pointed to, especially in relation to 
the lack of overtly critical engagement with the writing of Abdullah Öcalan, and not 
tackling issues of sexuality and morality, there is no doubt that Kurdish women’s 
rights activists together with the wider Kurdish political movement have developed an 
impressive feminist critique and interventions in terms of the masculinised and 
patriarchal character of the nation state and patriarchal and authoritarian leadership. 
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